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Re-viewing routines through a Pragmatist lens 
 
Abstract: The practice-based view that currently dominates the routines literature is based on an ostensive-
performative duality. However, from the perspective of process philosophy, this duality, or at least the manner 
in which it is applied, presents four key obstacles to a more processual theorization of routines. This chapter 
offers an alternative approach that builds on Pragmatist philosophy, especially the ideas of John Dewey and 
George Herbert Mead, which inform a performative rather than a representational approach to understanding 
ordinary everyday actions. The argument provides an account of the social and temporal situatedness of human 
conduct in terms of the inter-related processes of habit, inquiry, and conversational trans-actions.  
 
ŽŵƉŽŝƐĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐŐůŽďĂůŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌŽĨĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ?dŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
reputation for excellence is grounded in its strict adherence to the principles of 
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just in Time (JIT) production. Some years 
ago, the Board soughƚ ƚŽ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ŽŵƉŽ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ďǇ
investing in a cutting edge, completely automated, computer-integrated 
manufacturing system (CIM) for its printed circuit assemblies factory, which not 
only provided JIT supplies to CompCo, but also to a number of other computer 
assembly factories across Europe. CIM is a manufacturing concept that aims to 
eliminate human error and to enhance productivity by fully automating factory 
production processes. Depending entirely on real-time closed-loop feedback from 
automatic sensors and computerized monitoring to control production, CIM has 
been mythologizĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ  ?ůŝŐŚƚƐ-ŽƵƚ ? ĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŶĞĞĚƐ ŶŽ ŚƵŵĂŶ
presence other than a Controller who remotely monitors (rather than controls) the 
manufacturing processes.  
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CIM was implemented at CompCo using an "intelligent" software system in which 
links between the physical (automated workstations and belt conveyors) and 
software "layers" of the CIM were facilitated by means of bar-codes. All the 
components necessary for any scheduled product were picked up and loaded by 
robots into bar-coded plastic trays. Automated belt conveyors connected a central 
dispatching station with the various workstations where robotic systems used 
these components to assemble the required products. Because of the complexity 
ŽĨŽŵƉŽ ?ƐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƌĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ƚhe prototype CIM initially 
retained a few manually operated workstations. This human presence was 
tolerated as a temporary aberration that would be replaced by full automation 
within a matter of months. One day during this interim period, the whole system 
stopped working for no apparent reason; carefully planned production routines 
were thrown into complete disarray. It took the combined efforts of designers, 
engineers, computer scientists, and technicians over several (very costly) days to 
discover the problem. A rogue plastic components tray had introduced an 
unexpected bar code that the intelligent factory could not interpret, and another 
plastic tray with a monitored bar-code had altogether vanished.  
 
These events were experienced by one of us (Philippe) some 20 years ago, while he was 
working as a management controller at CompCo. He was fully engaged as a participant in this 
episode, contributing to the analysis and feedback processes that ensued. Over the following 
five years, he continued to discuss the episode with others who had been involved in this 
situation, then later he extended his exploration with academic colleagues. To us, it is a story 
that invites questions about often invisible and taken-for-granted assumptions regarding 
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human action at the human-machine interface, and in particular about the situated actions 
that emerge through social interactions. There is an element of unanticipated human 
intervention that must be unraveled if lessons are to be learned from the CompCo experience. 
How are we to understand what happens when well-planned actions fall apart, and how 
should we theorize the improvisational actions that inevitably arise in such situations 
(Suchman, 1987)?  
 
Routines theory has potential to open up some useful insights into the CompCo story. For 
instance, it might seek to understand how production routines changed while at the same 
time persisting throughout the introduction of the new CIM system (Howard-Grenville, 2005). 
It might demonstrate how patterns of action were varied, retained and selected in the 
evolution of production routines (Pentland et al., 2012). Or it might map the learning 
processes that accompany this evolving process (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). More generally, 
a practice-based theorization of routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003) may 
be ǀĞƌǇŚĞůƉĨƵůŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚŽǁƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ?
maintaining, disrupting, and changing routines, where these are understood ĂƐ “ƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ?
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĂďůĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚďǇŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?(Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003: 95). This definition not only recognizes human agency in the 
performation of routines, but it also acknowledges the relationality of social (and material) 
interactions. What is missing though, is a thorough-going theorization of the temporal 
dimensions of those situated actions that comprise routines. This is precisely where process 
theory might very productively intersect with contemporary understandings of routines.  
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In this chapter, we pursue this opportunity for theory development firstly by investigating the 
ontological and epistemological status of routines in organizing processes. Analyzing the 
limits of routines theory, both in its historical behaviorist form (March and Simon, 1993) and 
in its later practice-based form (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), we uncover four  obstacles to 
a more processual appreciation of  human conduct. Next, we propose an alternative 
theorization inspired by Pragmatist thinking about human action as a continuously emerging 
social process of meaning-making. Taking human conduct as the motive force for social 
change, the Pragmatists developed a practical and fundamentally processual understanding 
of those movements that shape, and are shaped by our everyday experiences of living. We 
focus particularly on the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, both of whom are 
already known to the routines community (Cohen, 2007; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013; 
Winter, 2013), but here we go further by exploring three specific dimensions (habit, inquiry, 
and conversational trans-action) in their Pragmatist theory of creative action (Joas, 1996). As 
we unfold each of these dimensions, we will return to CompCo to illustrate and deepen our 
practical understandings of the situation. We argue that these three dimensions, taken in 
combination, offer fresh insights into the relational and temporal dynamics of routines. 
 
1. A processual critique of routines theory 
Scholarly interest in routines as mechanisms for the accomplishment of organizational work 
has been growing steadily for the past three decades (Becker, 2004; Parmigiani and Howard-
Grenville, 2011), but arguably it was the seminal work of March and Simon, first published in 
1958, that opened this topic up to organizational researchers. They suggested that the 
activities associated with problem-solving may be ƌŽƵƚŝŶŝǌĞĚ “to the degree that choice has 
ďĞĞŶƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĨŝǆĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƐƚŝŵƵůŝ ?(1993: 163). They 
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further recognized that the  ‘rationality ? of the chooser is always bounded by the specifics of 
both past experience and current situation. Thus for them, ĂƌŽƵƚŝŶĞŝƐĂ “ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐ
been developed and learned at some previous time as an appropriate response for a stimulus 
ŽĨƚŚŝƐĐůĂƐƐ ?(1993: 160). The behaviorist language of stimulus-response is pervasive in March 
ĂŶĚ ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? /ƚ ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚroutinized activity is determined by some sort of 
environmental stimulus, and that the learned response to this stimulus is immediately 
available without further cognitive intervention. There is a clear causal sequence - first 
stimulus, then response - so routines are understood as automatically triggered responses to 
previously experienced stimuli. Problem-solving activities are invoked only by exception, 
when the available repertoire of routine responses, or performance programs, proves 
inadequate for a given stimulus. Even in this situation though, March and Simon envisage the 
execution of procedural plans based on pre-existing procedures for problem-solving. 
 
This stimulus-response model is underpinned by a representational theory of mind. That is, it 
assumes the classic Cartesian separation of mind and body, which understands thinking as a 
way of forming cognitive representations of the experienced world, and acting as the 
execution of already formed representations. This dualistic formulation is, however, a serious 
point of contention for process theorists, who see it as cutting across the very processes that 
are of interest, reducing movement to static representations, and thereby failing to account 
for the relational and temporal dynamics of practical organizational situations (Simpson, 
2009). As far back as 1896, Dewey was arguing that the only way to overcome dualisms such 
as stimulus-response is by not starting from disjointed parts (i.e. stimuli, processing, 
responses), but by asking how these parts hang together. In his view, it is not that the stimulus 
sets the organism in motion, but rather the organism, as long as it is alive, is always already 
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in motion. Living means moving. Stimulus and response are then each understood as 
complete acts that are mutually constituting in the processes of living rather than being 
related in a strictly causal sequence (Burbules, 2004). This re-conceptualization of stimulus 
and response as an ongoing and dynamic interplay requires an ontological shift away from 
the substantialist assumptions of a representational idiom, towards the processual 
assumptions of a performative idiom (Pickering, 1995), which emphasizes way-finding rather 
than navigation (Chia and Holt, 2009; Suchman, 1987), and novelty emergence rather than 
predictability of outcomes (Garud et al., 2015).  
 
Perhaps anticipating this critique, March and Simon stressed the subjective and social nature 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ which, far from being a purely physiological reflex, they saw as 
ƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƵƚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǀĞƌǇŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?/Ŷ
psychological theories, a stimulus is a mere perceptual phenomenon but, giving the example 
of customer order management, March and Simon stretched this concept into a much thicker 
and more complex idea that comes close to the notion of a constructed narrative. Responding 
to these definitional issues, Feldman and Pentland (2003) re-framed routines as complex 
systems of action that engage both ostensive and performative aspects.  “dŚĞ ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
aspect is the ideal or schematic form of a routine. It is the abstract, generalized idea of the 
routine, or the routine in principle. The performative aspect of the routine consists of specific 
actions, by specific people, in specific places and times. It is the routine in practice. Both of 
these aspects are necessary for an organizational routine to exist ? (2003: 101). Feldman and 
Pentland took their inspiration for this re-theorization from their reading of Latour (1986), 
who contrasted ostensive and performative approaches to the problem of power and its 
functioning in society. However, he argued that the ostensive and the performative are 
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ontologically distinct and incommensurable perspectives that defy efforts of integration into 
a single unified theory. His defŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƐĂǇƐ  “In principle it is possible to 
discover properties which are typical of life in society and could explain the social link and its 
evolution, though in practice ƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĚĞƚĞĐƚ ?(1986: 272), while he defined 
ƚŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ “/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞin principle to define the list of properties that would 
be typical of life in society although in practice ŝƚ ŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?(1986: 273). Whilst 
either definition might be adopted to study power, like oil and water, the ostensive and 
performative cannot be blended together. 
 
Drawing these threads of critique together, we see four key obstacles to a more processual 
theorization of routines: 
 
Obstacle 1 Duality or dualism? 
Dualisms are a recognized problem for those theories of action that seek to account for the 
mutually constituting dynamics of human conduct (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984; Joas, 
1996). A dualism separates systems of action into discrete entities, each of which is defined 
in opposition to the other, each therefore being immanent in the other (e.g. mind is that 
aspect of human experience that is not body, and vice versa). There is thus an underlying 
commonality (the system of action itself) that allows opposing aspects to be unified in an 
inclusive theory, but one that necessarily lacks dynamism because it is built out of stable 
entitative units. Both Giddens and Bourdieu rejected dualistic accounts in favor of the 
numerical ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĚƵĂůŝƚǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ůŝŬĞ >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ
performative definitions, is based on two alternative ways of being in, and knowing about the 
world. The social worlds in which we live are, of course, whole and continuous; they appear 
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to have dual, or plural, natures only because of the limitations of our theoretical (and 
philosophical) assumptions (Dewey, 1917). There is no possibility of unifying these different 
natures, at least not at the same level of experience as that which created the duality. 
Nevertheless, the alternative positions are useful to the extent that they offer radically 
different insights into human action.  
 
Feldman and Pentland presented their ostensive-performative framing of routines in terms 
of a duality, which calls ĨŽƌ “ĂŶĞǁŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?(2003: 95). In 
their description of academic hiring practices in Universities they recognized the paradox 
inherent in this duality whereby routines are both infinitely variable and yet easily 
identifiable. However, in proposing a unifying  “ŽƐƚensive-ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ?(2003: 103), 
it is not clear how Feldman and Pentland have tackled the profound ontological differences 
implied by this duality. Furthermore, they have argued that the ostensive and the 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĂƌĞ “ƚǁŽƌĞůĂƚĞĚƉĂƌƚƐ ?(2003: 95) ?ŽƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐ ? “ĂĐŚ
part is necessary, but neither part alone is sufficient to explain (or even describe) the 
properties of the phenomenon we refer to as  ‘organizational routines ? ? (2003: 95). This seems 
to suggest a slippage towards the sort of dualistic thinking that would admit both terms, 
ostensive and performative, as qualifiers of the same underlying concept, namely routines. 
Latour is very clear that in his view, ostensive theories of society have run their course, so 
ŶŽǁ “ǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵĂŶŽƐƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŽĂƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?(Latour, 1986: 
272). He does not suggest that this approach can be bolted on to existing, representational 
notions of practice. His advice would seem to be that more effort is required to better theorize 
the performative view. 
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Obstacle 2 A variance-based theory of learning and organizing 
A further implication of dualistic thinking is that it tends to suggest a causal connection 
between the ostensive and performative aspects of routines such that the performative 
generates new ideas that transform the ostensive, while ƚŚĞ  “ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ
implications of the ostensive encourage modifications in actual performances (Feldman, 
2000). This leads to routines being conceived as dual learning systems that engage both 
ostensive and performative aspects (see Figure 1). The resulting scheme of learning and 
organizing is variance-based: it is the perceived gap between the ostensive and the 
performative that motivates ongoing change. Following this logic, a good fit between 
ostensive and performative aspects would generate a high level of stability, or even resistance 
ƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? “A close match seems likely to indicate and predict stability and perhaps inertia. 
MŽƌĞ ĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞ ŵĂƚĐŚĞƐ ƐĞĞŵ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ Žƌ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?
(Pentland and Feldman, 2005: 805).  Langley (1999) critically contrasted variance-based 
theories with process theories, arguing that the former are concerned with explaining 
efficient causal relationships between discrete variables amongst which time ordering is 
immaterial to the outcomes (Mohr, 1982), while the latter are more appropriate for mapping 
the probabilistic patterns of time-ordered events. Whereas variance-based theories provide 
a perspective on planned actions over time, process theories seek to engage in a continuous 
rethinking and adaptation of action in time.  We argue it is this processual perspective that 
needs to be further developed within the routines literature. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Obstacle 3 The temporal ƉƌŽďůĞŵůƚŚŽƵŐŚƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨ
ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ŝŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ(Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 94), the literature 
remains largely mute about their timing and temporality. We can, however, infer a strong 
logical (cause-effect) and temporal (sequential) link between the ostensive and performative 
aspects of routines. The ostensive refers to cognitive representations expressed as artefacts 
such as plans and operating procedures, while the performative is concerned with situated 
action (Suchman, 1987). The ostensive is assumed to shape and direct performation (or vice 
versa), implying a sequential theory of time: there are successive phases of thought 
(modeling, programming, representing) and action (performing, executing). However, in 
making a separation between thought and action, this theoretical perspective denies the 
active function of the situation, as a potential source of doubt, beyond minor adjustments: 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůĚĞƚĂŝůƐƚŚĂƚƌĞŵĂŝŶ open  W and that must remain open  W for the 
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƚŽďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚ ?(Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 101).  
  
Whilst representationalism may be a useful fiction to analyze simple situations, it does not 
work in complex situations (Maturana and Varela, 1992). A more processual approach would 
situate action in the ongoing and entangled constructions that develop within thinking by/in 
doing, and doing by/in thinking. There can still be representations, but they do not have the 
same status as in cognitivist theories. They are just iconic mediations that serve as resources 
for situated action, but not the (determining) source of that action. As stressed by Weick 
(1998: 553), "[t]he process that animates these artifacts (structure, control, authority, 
planning, charters, and standard operating procedures) may well consist of ongoing efforts to 
rework and reenact them in relation to unanticipated ideas and conditions encountered in 
the moment". Thus performation, situated in the present moment and circumstances, has an 
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emergent and improvisational quality that is often "tacit, taken-for-granted" but nevertheless 
"part of the infrastructure present in all organizing" (Weick, 1998: 553). The future then 
appears to actors as an open horizon of possibilities to explore, while the past is a rich, diverse 
and often contradictory source of inspiration. We suggest, therefore, that routines theory 
would benefit from the explicit inclusion of more processual understandings of time and 
temporality. 
 
Obstacle 4 The micro-macro problem  
The micro-macro dualism is pervasive and well-recognized as a problem in the social 
sciences. The issue is, once a system has been separated into discrete levels of analysis, how 
is it then possible to reassemble the dynamic relationships between these levels? Routines 
theory faces a paradox: actual situated performances are generally viewed as occurring at 
the level of the individual, while the routine is an organization-level pattern involving 
multiple actors. However,  “[e]ven an abstract and presumed collective understanding of a 
routine is not invariable because actors ? understanding of a routine will vary with their role 
and perspective  ? ?ŝŶĂǁĂǇ ?that makes sense only to the individual in that setting ? 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005: 627). How then are we to move from subjective representations 
to organizational repetitive schemes? In the routines literature, it is often taken for granted 
that sociality is based on the commonality of representations: shared mental images, shared 
artificial / instrumental representations, shared discourses. Differences can then appear as 
imperfections which can raise difficulties:  “If individual orientations differ, we may see 
contests over the use of routines ? (Howard-Grenville, 2005: 627), implying that the normal 
use of routines is based on individual orientations that do not differ. If we take seriously the 
notion that all actions and all experiences are socially situated (Howard-Grenville, 2005), 
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then they can never be adequately theorized as either purely individual or purely 
organizational endeavors. Process theorists reject the practice of separating systems into 
discrete levels of analysis, arguing instead that processes flow across all levels of a system. 
Their concern is how these processes emerge through practical engagements within 
concrete situations.  
 
2. Pragmatism: A processual approach to human social experience 
WƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĨŝƌƐƚĂƌŽƐĞĂƐĂƚƌĞŶĐŚĂŶƚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨĞƐĐĂƌƚĞƐ ?ĞǆŚŽƌƚĂƚion that, in order 
to find absolute and universal truths, everything should be subjected to doubt. Charles 
Sanders Peirce, who is often cited as the father of Pragmatism, rejected the primacy that this 
Cartesian view affords the individual doubting thinker, isolated from the material and social 
world. Instead, he anchored his understanding of doubt in the local situated actions of 
ordinary day-to-day living, through which we discover together practical ways of coping with 
ůŝĨĞ ?ƐǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐ(Locke et al., 2008). Doubt arises when our actions meet with some form of 
resistance, and it may be resolved by reconstructing the meanings of either the self or the 
situation, or rather their relationship. This reconstructive activity, which Peirce called Inquiry, 
is a creative accomplishment that continuously injects the possibilities of novelty and change 
into the otherwise recurring patterns of social experience (Joas, 1996). The ontological 
category that underpins this Pragmatist position is process. That is, Pragmatists are more 
concerned with flow, movement, and the passage of events in time than with variables such 
as cognitive representations, objects, or the stuff of life more generally. Epistemologically 
their knowing is accomplished through relational engagement in conversations that 
transcend the usual dualisms permeating the organizational literature (e.g. stimulus-
response, subject-object, individual-organizational). Furthermore, Pragmatism invites 
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methodological innovation as researchers seek to go with the flow, themselves transforming 
as their research situations unfold.  
 
Of course it is not possible to articulate the whole of the Pragmatist canon in this short 
chapter. Instead we will focus on three interrelated Pragmatist concepts, habit, inquiry, and 
conversational trans-action, which we find particularly useful in our re-viewing of routines 
theory. Although we will now elaborate each of these concepts in turn, in a performative 
idiom they are intimately engaged together in the unfolding of experience and should not be 
considered as separate in practice, where habits are continuously involved in lived experience 
as a resource and mediation of ongoing inquiry, which is achieved collectively through 
conversational trans-action. 
 
2.1 Habit 
Within the routines literature, and organization studies more generally, the notion of habit is 
often presented as an idiosyncratic and purely individual mode of conduct (Hodgson, 1993; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982) that is contrasted to routines, which are taken to be organization-
level phenomena. For instance, Becker (1992: 328) defines habit in terms of mechanical 
behavior ƚŚĂƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ  “ĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƐƚĂŶĚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
the focus is very much on the micro-level. Such habits are stimulus-response reflexes that 
 “ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ŶŽ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ ?(Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 97). Pragmatists, 
however, see habit as much more than a mere tool in efficient and rational decision-making. 
For them, the defining quality of habit is its dispositional, rather than behavioral, orientation. 
 “ ?d ?ŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŚĂďŝƚŝƐĂŶĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƉƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ ǁĂǇƐŽƌŵŽĚĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?(Dewey, 
1922 [1957]: 32) ? /ƚ ŝƐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐ  “ĂŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?(Mead, 
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1938: 3) ? “tŚĂƚŚĂďŝƚŝƐĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶwhen and how ŝƚĐĂƵƐĞƐƵƐƚŽĂĐƚ ?(Peirce, 1878: 257). 
This dispositional understanding of habit continues to be valued by contemporary writers 
such as Bourdieu, Elias, and Deleuze (Crossley, 2013). 
 
Dewey put particular effort into re-defining habit as a Pragmatist concept. For him, habits are 
acquired and continuously modified through experience, but they never fully determine the 
course of action. They are simultaneously object, resource and outcome of inquiries that are 
both situated and recursive. A habit is neither a representation of actual action nor the actual 
performance of an action, but rather it is an acquired resource that mediates between the 
particular action situation and its organizational, social and temporal contexts. To be precise, 
it is an inherently social, lively and mutable (Cohen, 2007) organizing resource, a form of social 
language that makes action recognizable, repeatable and debatable. 
 
At CompCo, we see two different habits in play. Firstly, the rogue plastic components 
tray appeared in the system due to the actions of a human operator at one of the 
few remaining manual work stations. The operator noticed that one of the trays on 
the conveyor belt was damaged  ? one side was torn and twisted. Fearing that this 
tray could jam one of the machines, he found some unused trays in a corner of the 
workshop, he transferred the contents of the broken tray into a new tray, and placed 
the new tray on the conveyor belt. Understanding the operator's actions is neither 
straightforward nor obvious. He found himself immersed in an entirely unfamiliar 
environment populated by many robots but very few of the human beings more 
usually associated with his experience of manufacturing operations. What he did is 
surprising in this unfamiliar  ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ-ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞĐŚŽƐĞƚŽĂĐƚŽŶŚŝs 
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own initiative, rather than asking for help. However, his actions must be understood 
in the context of existing habits used by skilled workers in that factory. 
 
dŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŚŝƐǁĞůů-established habit born of intensive and long 
term training in TQM, which encourages taking initiative whenever possible to 
prevent defects and lost production. In engaging a habit from his experience (fixing 
ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĂŶĚůŽĐĂůůǇ ? ?ŚĞŝƐƋƵĂůŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŶ ?ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ
the ordinary processes of production: there is an established and stabilized 
production system; there are incidents; a competent operator fixes incidents 
whenever possible within the existing system. The practical language of TQM is 
involved in the understanding and the resulting enactment of the situation. 
 
Secondly, the CIM experts engaged different habits drawn from their cultural and 
professional experience in CIM. They are faced with an inexplicable difficulty when 
the system shuts down. From their perspective, the problem appears as a technical 
issue, either at the  ?ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ůĞǀĞů ? (sensors, actuators, robot mechanics, 
communication infrastructures, a broken part that has jammed a machine, an 
electrical incident, etc.) or at ƚŚĞ  ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞů ? (a bug in some part of the 
complex software and telecommunication architecture). The engineers use well-
established habits calling for detailed technical analyses and the resolution of error 
protocols. In doing so, they qualify the situation as a prototyping issue: this assembly 
workshop is an experimental unit; there may still be defects and bugs in the design 
of the system; and they must be fixed. 
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The TQM habit engaged by the operator arises as he imagines the potential future situation 
of a machine jammed by the broken tray (temporal context) and seeks to avoid difficulties for 
downstream operators (social context). The habit also transforms the primary meaning and 
definition of apparently simple objects, such as plastic trays, which prove much more complex 
and polysemous than at first glance. Should the plastic tray be considered a physical object 
characterized as broken or not broken, or is it rather an informational object that conveys 
vital systems information in the form of a bar-code? How this question is answered 
completely changes the way actors look at and engage with the object. 
 
Habits translate diffusely teleological social motives into immediate actions. They translate 
ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ǁŚǇƐ ?ŝŶƚŽĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ŚŽǁƐ ? ? ?ƐƐŽŽŶĂƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƉƌŽũected [an end], 
we must begin to work backward in thought. We must change what is to be done into a how, 
ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ?dŚĞĞŶĚƚŚƵƐƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ǁŚĂƚŶĞǆƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŶĞǆƚŽĨ
chief importance is the one nearest the present state of the one acting ... Now the thing which 
is closest to us, the means within our power, is a habit" (Dewey 1922/2002: 36-37). In 
CompCo, distinct habits translate distinct ends into distinct immediate actions. Running 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐƐ ŝƐ Ă  ‘ŚŽǁ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŚǇ ? P  ?ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ ĚĞďƵŐ ĂŶ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞďƌŽŬĞŶƚƌĂǇŝƐĂ ‘ŚŽǁ ?ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚǇ ? P ?ǁĞ
should fix production incidents". 
 
Habits must be reassessed in each present moment, even in apparently simple situations. At 
what point should a broken plastic tray be considered a prototyping event instead of an 
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ordinary production incident? The intelligence of the situation must be built continuously; it 
is not an automatic, Pavlovian reflex (Dewey and Bentley, 1949/2008). Habit transforms a 
singular act performed here and now into a socially meaningful gesture. Therefore, crucially, 
habit involves ongoing judgment so it cannot be equivalent to mindless repetition. "We must 
ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ŝŶ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ƚŽ ůŝŵŝƚ  ?ŚĂďŝƚ ?Ɛ ? ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŽ
repetition. It assumes from the start the identity of habit with routine. Repetition is in no 
sense the essence of habit. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of 
all. The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to 
particular acts" (Dewey, 1922 [1957]: 41-42). 
2.2 Inquiry 
 ‘/ŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵWƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚƐƵƐĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐůǇĂĚĂƉƚĞĚƚŽŶĞǁĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ‘ǁŚĂƚŶĞǆƚƐ ?(Lorino et al., 2011). It is an evolving 
and transformational process in which selves and situations are mutually engaged and always 
in-the-making (Elkjaer and Simpson, 2011).  Dewey (1938/1986) defined inquiry very 
specifically as the process that transforms an indeterminate, or doubtful situation into one 
that is sufficiently unified that a coherent course of action can be anticipated.  However, 
inquiry is not necessarily visible and neither does it always involve a perceptible rupture in 
habits.  
 
"Some forms of common sense inquiries, which aim at determining what is to be 
done in some practical predicament, are neither exceptional nor infrequent. For 
the stock and staple of common sense inquiries and judgments are of this sort. 
The deliberations of daily life concern in largest measure questions of what to 
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make or to do. Every art and every profession is faced with constantly recurring 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐŽƌƚ  ? &ĂƌŵĞƌ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝĐ ? ƉĂŝŶƚĞƌ ? ŵƵƐŝĐŝĂŶ ? ǁƌŝƚĞƌ ? ĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?
lawyer, merchant, captain of industry, administrator or manager, has constantly 
to inquire what is better to do next." (Dewey, 1938/1986: 162-63).  
 
EĞŝƚŚĞƌĂƌĞƚŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐƌĞĚƵĐŝďůĞƚŽ “ƵŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?(Dewey, 1922 
[1957]: 70). Human action involves both habit and inquiry: habit-based inquiries develop 
inquiry-based habits, and vice versa. Retrospectively the process of action may appear as the 
implementation of some pre-determined plan, but in the present the possibilities for action 
are manifold, the future is open, and even when uncertainty seems very low, options for 
action are still contingent.  
 
The CompCo story illustrates two distinct inquiry processes in relation to the 
breakdown of the CIM system. Firstly, the human operator was confronted with a 
problem  ? a broken plastic tray, which he assumed could cause a jam in the 
production system. At that point, several options were available to him  ? he might 
have pressed the emergency stop and brought the whole system to an immediate 
halt until a maintenance technician could be located; he might have called a 
member of the design team for advice; or he might have simply turned a blind eye 
to what he perceived to be a minor problem. In the event, he chose to use his own 
initiative, something that is very much encouraged in a TQM culture, replacing the 
broken tray on the conveyor belt. In choosing this action, he was responding to the 
justified expectations of the company, his peers, and the general TQM orientation 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ  ?ĚŽŝŶŐ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ũŽď ? ? ,Ğ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ĂŶ
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ordinary production incident, which then allowed him to move quickly to find a 
solution. In particular, since he was able to find a new tray, he assumed he had 
solved the problem immediately and locally, remaining the only actor involved in 
the inquiry. He was not aware of the function of the bar-coding of the plastic 
components trays, so when the system broke down, it never occurred to him that 
his actions may have been the cause. As far as he was concerned, his actions had 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ,Ğ ŚĂĚ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ Ă  ?ǁŚǇ ? ŝŶƚŽ Ă  ?ŚŽǁ ?
through a quick, albeit barely visible inquiry. 
 
Secondly, the inquiry that was triggered for the CIM experts when the prototype 
production system unaccountably stopped working, was quite visible and formally 
organized. It started from an implicit characterization of the problematic situation 
as a technical defect of the new production unit. This was a critical step, which 
required them to find a hypothetical explanation, which in turn defined what 
actors should be involved as inquirers (i.e. designers and engineers). There is (or 
should be) no opportunity for human error to affect the operation of a CIM system, 
so they looked for a breakdown in either the technical hardware or in the complex 
software that operates the system. Although the experts understood that a few 
human operators were still engaged in the process, these people were regarded 
ĂƐ  ?ŚŽŶŽƌĂƌǇ ƌŽďŽƚƐ ? ǁŚŽƐĞ ŚĂďŝƚƐ ŽĨ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁĞƌĞ Ăůů ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƉƌĞ-
programmed and predictable. Eventually they discovered that one of the bar-
coded trays did not match any planned order in the production schedule, and 
further that one other tray that was part of the scheduled production had 
disappeared, and could not be located by any of the multiple sensors. How could 
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the designers have anticipated that a plastic tray could vanish, and that an 
unknown plastic tray could burst in from nowhere?  
 
Inquiry does not start from a structured problem that needs solving. Rather, the first critical 
phase of inquiry entails the trĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ĨĞůƚ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ ? ŝŶƚŽ Ă ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?  ?There is 
nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the 
necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive. 
The first result of evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the 
problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are 
ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚĚĂƚĂĂƌĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ?(Dewey, 1938/1986: 111-112), what 
actors are involved as inquirers and which are left out, and the temporal and spatial scope of 
the inquiry (Lorino and Tricard, 2012). 
 
At CompCo the indeterminate situation first has no intellectual status, it is just an 
existential unease: a broken tray on the production line; the assembly line stops 
working. The first phase of the inquiry, often tacit and rarely verbalized, 
transforms this existential unease into a structured problem: the broken tray 
needs to be fixed or replaced, and the bug that stopped the system must be traced. 
 
Once a problem has been constructed, its resolution is sought by engaging abductive, 
deductive and inductive logics of reasoning (Lorino et al., 2011). Firstly, a plausible hypothesis 
accounting for the problematic situation is abductively inferred in order to restore 
intelligibility. Then the hypothesis is translated into empirically testable propositions through 
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deductive reasoning. Finally, induction develops an empirical protocol to test the propositions 
(Peirce, 1998: 441-442). The entire reasoning of inquiry is expressed through active 
experimentation in which thinking and acting are simultaneous and confluent dynamics. Of 
course the inquiry steps described here in a sequential way for the purposes of presentation, 
are inevitably iterative and entangled as they grope for new forms of understanding.  
 
Both inquiries at CompCo were framed by particular, but different problem 
definitions. Whereas the operator was able to conclude his inquiry quickly by 
problematizing the situation as a production incident, abducting an efficient 
solution, and then implementing it, the engineers repeatedly cycled through a 
series of inquiries because they were unable to abduct a plausible explanation for 
the system breakdown. Limited by their initial problem definition, they could not 
imagine any sensible hypotheses. This inquiry was eventually resolved only when 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƋƵŝƌǇƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ŶŽŶ-
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ? ?
 
2.3 Conversational trans-action1 
The purpose of inquiries and their associated habits is to make sensible the present situation 
so that practical actions may be discerned. This mobilization of habits and inquiries is situated 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂŶĚ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ŝŶ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ WƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚƐ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚ ?(Mead, 1938). 
Arising in the interplay between habit, inquiry and the transformation of organizational or 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚĐĂƌƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ “ĂĐŽŶƐŽůŝŶŐĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it" (Dewey 1922/2002: 331). 
Situating the whole act within the flow of experience emphasizes both the relational and 
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temporal extensiveness of the ongoing experience that structures organizing actions 
(Simpson, 2014). Evidently agency is in play in this process as choices are made about what 
and how adjustments are made, but in the Pragmatists' view, this agency is explicitly social 
rather than individualistic in its expression. It is a form of agency that arises in conversation, 
and as such, it pervades the social situation (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Simpson, 2009).  
 
Mead (1934) did not conceive "conversation" as the mere transmission and reception of vocal 
utterances, but as an ongoing dynamic of gesture and response, within which situations are 
continuously reconstructed as conversants come to see what is happening through each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞǇĞƐ ?It is then the very medium of inquiry. Each gesture in a conversation (whether it 
be vocal utterance, silence, body language, or mood) is a way of probing the meanings of the 
situation and of testing out what may happen next. When we gesture, we are not simply 
sending a message, we are also trying to anticipate the possible responses that our gesturing 
ŵĂǇĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?ǇƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞůǇƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐŚŽĞƐ ?ǁĞďƵŝůĚĂŶĚŵĂŝntain sociality so 
that we can be open to a range of potential responses. Mead understood the conversational 
flow as a mutually constituting dynamic that engages the meanings of conversants' situations 
and conversants' selves. Describing this process as a mere interaction between distinct 
entities is inadequate, whereas ĞǁĞǇ  ? ĞŶƚůĞǇ ?Ɛ(1949/2008) ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐ-ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?is 
intended to indicate that all entities participating in an inquiry are involved on an equal 
footing and that their very definition and delineation is completely contingent on the progress 
of the inquiry. 
 
In a conversational situation, this trans-actional approach implies that meaning-making 
cannot be attributed to any individual, but rather it emerges continuously from the very 
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processes of conversing (see also Bakhtin, 1981; Shotter, 2008; Tsoukas, 2009). Any act is 
always addressed by and addresses other acts, and its meaning depends upon the responses 
it evokes. Conversation can thus be understood as a continuous process of usually quite 
subtle, mutual re-orientations. Of course, we carry our habits with us into every conversation, 
and it is here that these dispositional attitudes are tested and adjusted to bring better, more 
practically useful understandings of the evolving situation. Ultimately it is selves, and their 
dispositions to act, that are transformed in conversation, so ŝŶDĞĂĚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ? “ƐĞůǀĞƐĞǆŝƐƚ
only in relation to other selvĞƐ ?(1925: 278).  
 
The conversational trans-action is not only relational, but also temporal. In Mead's view 
(1932), social agency engages both the past and the future as resources that give meaning 
and direction to actions in the present moment. As we proceed in our living and acting 
together, we rebuild both past experiences and anticipated futures to continuously re-author 
our understandings in response to what seems to be going on in the present  moment 
(Simpson, 2014). Presents then, are emergent turning points in the flow of living; they are 
events that arise whenever something happens. They are the creative confluence of two or 
more different temporalities. It is in the interweaving of pasts and futures that temporal 
experience is continuously constituted in the present moment (Hernes et al., 2013; Lorino 
and Mourey, 2013; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002).  
 
Examining the CompCo story through the lens of conversational trans-actions 
allows us to step back and take a wider view of the social and temporal dynamics 
of the situation. We see that the operator and the CIM experts were engaged in 
quite different temporalities where each had a history of experience that led to 
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ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ĨƵƚƵƌĞƐ ? dŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞ ůĞĚ Śŝŵ ƚŽ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ Ă
potential future in which the damaged tray might cause a major problem in the 
automated production system, and then to resolve this problem using his 
initiative. The tacit characterization of the situation as an ordinary production 
incident led to the specific temporal and social configuration of this inquiry. The 
time horizon of the inquiry was very short - usually production incidents are 
resolved within a matter of minutes. Potential legitimate inquirers are the normal 
participants in manufacturing operations: the operator, possibly his/her 
supervisors and quality controllers, but certainly not system designers. 
 
In contrast, the CIM experts brought deep technical experience to bear on this 
critical situation. Their tacit characterization of the situation as a system design 
issue - the debugging of a technical prototype - led to a specific temporal and social 
configuration over a time horizon spanning the life cycle of the equipment. 
Legitimate actors were those who would normally be involved with design issues: 
automation designers and software engineers, but not operators. As a result, the 
designers' conversational trans-action did not at first involve the operators - 
equally, the operator's decision to replace the tray had not involved the designers.  
 
In a later phase of inquiry, the designers did involve the operators, but only as 
potential witnesses - had they observed some sign that might be meaningful from 
a design point of view? In taking this action however, a new conversational 
configuration was opened up, and the designers discovered the operator's 
 ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŐĞƐƚƵƌĞ ?ŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐůŽǁůǇĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨthe conversation. 
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Both the operator and the CIM experts had been functioning within closed and 
separate social and temporal frames. It was only when conversations began to 
span these boundaries that new understandings were generated and the problem 
was eventually identified and remedied. 
 
There is a close link between the conversational form of sociality and temporality (Roth, 
2014). The conversational trans-action is not the  ‘ũŽŝŶƚ ? Žƌ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ?production of several 
participants, but the ongoing re-generation of differences. Conversant A moves the situation 
in a direction which makes it new for B; B responds to A by moving the situation in a direction 
that makes it new for A ... and so on. The present is fleshed out through this recurrent turn-
taking as successive turns lead to the gradual emergence of a mediate shape, a kind of 
discourse in acts (Lorino, 2014). Just as music can never be fully appreciated as a mere 
sequence of sounds, it is the conversational flow that communicates the overall tone of 
coordinated action. Hypothetical accounts of the past, invisible expectations of the future, 
and the gradual emergence of sense in the dialogical dynamics of trans-action are thus 
temporally linked and interdependent.  
 
At CompCo we can imagine that operators may report no specific observation that 
could put engineers on a relevant track to find the bug. But equally, one of the 
operators might have mentioned that the only problem he met was fortunately a 
problem that he could easily solve by himself, which in turn may have triggered a 
new abductive phase in the inquiry leading the engineers to a new hypothesis. 
  
3. Discussion 
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This chapter is motivated by a desire to explore what, if anything, a processual view of 
organizing might add to the currently flourishing literature on organizational routines, 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?Ɛ ?ŽĨĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?(Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003: 94). Looking through the lens of process philosophy and theory, we see 
four key obstacles to a more fluid understanding of how routines are created, maintained, 
disrupted, and changed. Firstly, we challenge the assumption that ostensive and performative 
aspects of routines can be united under a single theoretical umbrella. We agree with Latour 
(1986) that a more productive way forward could be to focus exclusively on developing 
routines theory within a performative idiom. Of course we acknowledge that this is the road 
less travelled, but for this very reason it is a path that offers great opportunity to adventurous 
researchers. Secondly, we point to implicit variance-based assumptions that relate the 
ostensive and the performative to each other through mutually causal mechanisms. There 
are two central tenets of variance-based theories that conflict with more processual 
approaches: (i) they assume the situation being examined is sufficiently stable that any timing 
differences amongst variables will have no material influence on outcomes; and (ii) they 
assume that all action is preceded by cognition. By contrast, process theories assume that the 
situations in which we find ourselves are continuously and endlessly unfolding, and within 
this flow, thinking and acting reside together as mutually constituting dynamics.  
 
Thirdly, we observe that there is no explicit theorization of temporality in the routines 
literature. Of course the importance of time as an independent variable as routines unfold 
from their antecedents to their outcomes, is well recognized (Turner, 2014), and there is also 
increasing scholarly interest in the temporal orientations of actors in routines (Howard-
Grenville, 2005), but in these examples, and in the routines literature more generally, time 
28 
 
remains the abstract time of measuring, dating, and sequencing. It articulates the past as an 
already known and determined history, while the future is extrapolated from past experience. 
However, this time-reckoning perspective cannot describe the temporality of the 
performative flow of living with its characteristics of emergence, unpredictability, and 
irreversibility. For example, how can we appreciate the temporality of an ordinary 
conversation that leads to new understandings, the temporality of wine-growers nursing their 
vineyard through uncertain weather, or the temporality of a football game with its many 
twists and turns?  Whilst routines are undeniably present in each of these examples, they are 
situated within the flow of temporality rather than simply marching to the external rhythm of 
time. The inherently processual nature of the performative idiom demands a temporal 
understanding of the present moment as continuously emergent in the interplay between 
remembered pasts and imagined futures. Finally, distinctions such as micro-macro, but also 
individual-organizational, stimulus-response, and stability-change, may function as dualisms 
that arrest the flow of action, and reduce dynamic situations to static representational forms. 
WƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ďǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ƐĞĞŬƐ Ă  “ ?practical ŚŽůŝƐŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĞƐĐŚĞǁƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŵĂĐǇ ŽĨ
mentalism, cognitivism or even intentionality in engaging with the day-to-day affairs of the 
ǁŽƌůĚ ?(Chia and MacKay, 2007: 228). 
 
To move forward from these critiques, we have proposed an alternative theorization that 
resonates particularly with the performative idiom. Drawing on Pragmatist thinking, we have 
developed an argument that frames the social and temporal dimensions of ordinary everyday 
practice in terms of the mutually embedded and practically inseparable dynamics of habit, 
inquiry and conversational trans-action. We see the performativity of routines then, as 
provisionally constituted in the intelligent engagement of inquiry, understood as a 
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continuously emergent conversational process in which habitual predispositions to act in 
certain ways in certain situations are constantly exposed to the experimental logics of 
abduction, deduction and induction. The existential doubt that initiates an inquiry generates 
actions, out of which the problem and the solution co-emerge. This is a very different 
approach from the stimulus-response of March and Simon (1993), where a routine is 
understood as being triggered by an already fully structured problem. It is holistic experience, 
rather than reflexes or cognitions, that allows us to connect particular types of situations to 
arrays of potential options for action. Further, because actors choose amongst their abducted 
ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ ŝŶ ĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŶĞǆƚ ? ? ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŵĂǇ ƌemain stable, it may be radically 
disruptive and creative, or it may be anything in between. Actions then, are generative to the 
extent that different histories of experience may coincide to produce alternative anticipated 
futures. By positioning inquiry alongside conversational trans-action, our performative view 
of routines is fundamentally temporal as it locates actions in the perpetually unfolding 
present.  
  
The Pragmatist approach we are advocating is concerned primarily with the flow of 
experience and processes of mutual transformation. As such, it is both ontologically 
processual, and epistemologically conversational and relational. These foundational 
assumptions invite new methodological approaches that engage with underlying processual 
dynamics, not only through historical analyses, but also by participating directly in the social 
and temporal presentƐŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŚŽůŝƐŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
This requires us to step away from  ‘levels of analysis ? or other dualistic framings, and to 
immerse ourselves in the confluence of multiple, socially and temporally situated flows of 
action. It also invites us to carefully re-language the ways we talk about action in order to 
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avoid the stasis of representations and keep the dynamics alive in our analytical framings 
(Mesle, 2008). tŚŝůƐƚƚŚŝƐŶĞĞĚŝƐǁĞůůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚŝŶ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?tĞŝĐŬ ?Ɛ(1979) entreaty to 
replace nouns with verbs in our research descriptions, the rush towards the gerund-ing of 
everything has perhaps now been overdone in the organizational literature. A more subtle re-
languaging is called for. We suggest that the confluence of habits, inquiries and conversational 
trans-actions as defined by the Pragmatists offers just such a re-languaging of familiar ideas 
in ways that open up new possibilities for analysis and research more generally.  
 
In reviewing the routines literature, we are conscious that the field itself is in a state of 
dynamic emergence. Step by step, the initial behaviorist account of routines has been 
deconstructed and replaced by an increased recognition that situated (performative) action 
is not the same as planned or programmed action. What we are proposing here is yet another 
step in this process, a step that is timely given recent developments in the field. At the 
conference that informed this edited volume, Martha Feldman (2014) proposed a new action-
based model of routines built on processes of  ‘patterning ? and  ‘performing ?. We see this as a 
very exciting move that sits remarkably comfortably with our Pragmatist argument, which 
allows us to  understand patterning and performing, not as contrasting constructs, but as two 
mutually constituting flows within the same process, that of inquiry. We hope, therefore, that 
the Pragmatist take on habits, inquiry, and conversational trans-actions will resonate with 
further developments that advance the performative idiom in routines theory. 
 
Ultimately, the real strength of the Pragmatist approach we have articulated is that it 
accounts for both the situatedness of actions in terms of the social and relational contexts in 
which they arise, and also for the continuous reconstruction of pasts and futures in the flow 
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of present experience. In doing so, it holds the potential for new theory that integrates the 
social and the temporal in a thorough-going performative exposition of the means by which 
the work of organizing is accomplished. 
 
4. Note 
1 Here we follow Dewey and Bentley (1949/2008) in hyphenating this word to differentiate 
its meaning from other common usage, especially in economics and psychoanalysis.  
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